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The Functions of Australian Banks’ Branch Networks:  
The Diversification of Risks and Spatial Allocation of Capital 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the consequences of branch banking for the Australian economy. 
There is little evidence to show that branching increased the stability of Australian 
banking. During the 1893 crisis, banks with more extensive branch networks, 
particularly those that had rapidly expanded their networks during the long boom of 
1866-89, were more likely to suspend payments. However, it is shown that branching 
increased the availability of capital and provision of banking services in rural areas. 
This occurred because, unlike unit banks, which were tied to a specific location, 
branch banks could internally reallocate capital from urban to rural regions at low 
cost. 
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I. Introduction  
 
A well-functioning banking system is a necessary precondition for sustained 
economic growth. Banks are essential for matching borrowers and lenders, 
transforming risks and maturity, moving capital across regions, and providing 
information about risks and returns. It has been argued that banks are the single most 
important financial institution in early stages of economic development (White 1998). 
In Australia trading banks were by far the largest and most important financial 
intermediary prior to the World War Two.1 They also provided the main mechanism 
for the transfer of domestic and English capital into the colonies’ nascent pastoral and 
mining industries (Butlin 1987; Dyster and Meredith 1990). 
 
This paper examines the consequences of branch banking for the early development 
of the Australian economy, focusing particularly on whether, relative to a unit 
banking system, extensive branching increased the stability of the banking system and 
contributed to the development of the rural economy. From the time of initial 
settlement, Australia imposed few restrictions on the extent of branch networks. 
Individual banks were allowed to maintain a network of branches and agencies within 
and across the antipodean colonies. By the early 1890s, Australia had one of the most 
developed branch banking systems in the world, with more banking offices per capita 
than any other country (Butlin 1986; Vamplew 1987, series POP25; Australia 1931; 
Grossman 1994). A. E. Webster commented in 1893, ‘The antipodes, but for the prior 
claim of Scotland, might almost be said to be the home of branch banking. In no 
[other] quarter of the world is such enterprise in this direction exhibited’ (Webster 
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1893, p. 24). Initially, all branches were primarily located in the population centres; 
however, during the latter part of the nineteenth century the banks increasingly 
followed the gold miners and pastoralists into rural areas. By the late-nineteenth 
century most banking offices were in rural areas, despite the fact that the colonies 
were becoming increasingly urbanized.  
 
The relative efficiency of branch and unit banking has been an extensively analyzed 
topic (Calomiris 1993; Calem and Nakamura 1990; Carlson 2004; Chapman and 
Westerfield 1942; Sprague 1902). Branch banking has the inherent disadvantage of 
greater agency problems. Directors of unit banks typically possess intimate 
knowledge of their local economy. On the other hand, branch banks, particularly in 
the Australian environment where the branch network was spread out over a vast, but 
sparsely populated area, must appoint local managers who are not residual claimants 
of their own efforts. Economists have offered several reasons why branch banking 
may yield benefits that more than offset the added agency costs. This paper focuses on 
two reasons that may have been pertinent to Australia: greater stability of the banking 
system as a result of portfolio diversification across regions and greater provision of 
services to rural areas as a result of branch specialization.2  
 
Most recent literature on the merits of branch banking argues that its superiority is 
primarily due to the fact that branching leads to more diversified asset portfolios 
(Calomiris 1990 and 1993; Carlson 2004; Grossman 1994; Hughes, et. al. 1996; Pope 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1In 1901 trading banks possessed total assets of £116.6 million while savings banks only possessed 
£32.9 million. The total assets of other financial intermediaries such as building societies, life offices, 
and friendly societies were smaller still (Pope 1987; Butlin 1987). 
2In addition economists have argued that branch banking was better suited to funding large-scale 
industrial firms (Giedeman 2005), that it led to competition between banks at multiple locations (Calem 
and Nakamura 1990), that it reduced the safe level of reserve ratios that banks needed to maintain 
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1987; and White 1983). The asset portfolio of a banking office, whether a branch or 
unit bank, is mainly comprised of loans made in the local area. Such a portfolio faces 
inherent risks due to localized shocks. Unlike a unit bank, a branch bank can diversify 
these risks geographically, as localized shocks are imperfectly correlated across 
regions. Thus, branch banking increases the stability of the system by reducing the 
variability of individual banks’ asset portfolios. Other authors have argued that the 
reduction of the variability of the returns on a given class of assets leads branch banks 
to invest more heavily in riskier assets, and thus branching may not result in an 
overall less risky portfolio (Hughes, et. al. 1996; Carlson 2004). Butlin (1961) and 
Merrett (1985) argue that in nineteenth century Australia this second effect dominated 
the first, and banks which most rapidly expanded their branch network during the long 
boom also ignored basic prudency standards with regard to their asset portfolios.3 
 
An alternative argument of the superiority of branch banking is based on the lower 
cost of internally transferring capital between branches relative to raising capital on 
the external market. If the costs of borrowing from the external market exceed the 
returns on loans, then a unit bank is constrained by the amount of local capital it can 
raise through deposits and by its ability to find suitable local borrowers. On the other 
hand, for a branch bank these constraints apply to the entire network, but individual 
branches within the network could specialize in either deposits or advances 
(Anonymous 1900; Anonymous 1893; Baxter 1883; Chapman and Westerfield 1942; 
Moffatt 1915). By reallocating capital between branches across regions, a branch bank 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Calomiris 1993 and Chapman and Westerfield 1942), and that it provided greater convenience to 
customers who transacted at multiple locations (Chapman and Westerfield 1942). 
3 The long boom, which occurred between 1866 and 1889, was a period of unprecedented economic 
growth in Australia. Real GDP (1911-12 prices) increased from £55.5 million to £184.8 million. Real 
per capita GDP increased by 30 percent over the period (Vamplew 1987, series ANA46, ANA79, 
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could more efficiently match borrowers and savers than could a unit bank, which 
depended on its local customer base. The ability to reallocate capital across regions 
may have been particularly important for small, isolated communities that had 
relatively few potential depositors. In the Australian context, these communities 
typically required capital to develop large-scale mining, timber, or pastoral industries, 
but could generate few deposits until these industries had been established for several 
years. At the turn of the twentieth century, the primary sector accounted for 
approximately one third of Australian GDP, nearly three times the contribution of 
manufacturing. A high proportion of the primary and secondary sector was large-scale 
operations in industries such as mining, forestry, livestock, and their manufacturing 
derivatives (Vamplew 1987, series ANA50-ANA54).  
 
In this paper I examine both the portfolio diversification and branch specialization 
hypotheses in the Australian context. I use data on the assets and branch networks of 
all Australian trading banks from Butlin, Hall and White (1971); Butlin (1986); and 
Mackay (1931) to examine whether branching increased the probability of banks’ 
survival after the end of the long boom and reduced the probability that they 
suspended payments during the panic of 1893. I then present a simple, but formal 
model showing why branch banks are better than unit banks at transferring capital 
between capital-surplus regions (typically urban) to capital-deficit regions (typically 
rural). Finally, I use unpublished data from the Annual Reports of the Union Bank of 
Australia (UBA) on the deposits and loans held by individual branches to examine the 
extent to which the branches of this bank were specialized. The evidence indicates 
that branch specialization provides a better explanation for the advantages of branch 
                                                                                                                                                                      
POP25). The long boom ended abruptly with the crash of a speculative bubble in the property market 
and was followed by the deep and protracted depression of the 1890s. 
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banking to the Australian economy than diversification. Contrary to the predictions of 
the diversification model, banks that maintained extensive branch networks, and 
particularly those that rapidly expanded their networks during the long boom, were 
more likely to suspend payments during the banking panic of 1893. On the other 
hand, the UBA data indicate considerable specialization by individual branches. 
Typically, newer branches and those in rural regions issued more advances than they 
collected in deposits, whereas the reverse was true for more established and urban 
branches. It is also shown that a large proportion of the UBA’s branches in 1900 and 
1930 could not have been profitably operated as unit banks. 
 
The outline for the remainder of this paper is as follows. After the introduction, the 
second section provides a short overview of branch banking in Australia. The third 
section examines portfolio diversification and the effects of branch growth during the 
long boom on the performance of trading banks during the 1893 crisis. The fourth 
section examines branch specialization, developing a simple theoretical model and 
examining the loans and advances of the individual branches of the UBA. The fifth 
section concludes.  
 
II. Branch Banking in Australia 
 
Like most post-settlement economic institutions, the Australian banking system was 
modelled on its British counterpart. Banks faced few or no restrictions on maintaining 
networks of branches and agencies.4 Between 1817 and 1914, 58 trading banks were 
opened in Australia. As a consequence of failures and mergers, the maximum number 
                                                          
4The only restrictions on branching were cross-colony restrictions in the charters of some banks. 
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open at any point in time was 31, which occurred in 1890. Figure 1 shows the number 
of trading banks and banking offices in Australia between 1817 and 1929. Because 
the colonies were sparsely settled, the number of offices initially grew very slowly. 
From the 1850s the number of branches grew rapidly, particularly in Victoria, where 
Melbourne was emerging as the financial center of the colonies. In 1859 there were 
178 branches in Australia, with 96 in Victoria alone. The long boom witnessed an 
acceleration of branch growth, and between 1866 and 1890 both the number of 
branches and the value of assets held by trading banks increased more than seven-
fold. With the exception of the depression of the 1890s, branch growth continued 
uninterrupted until the 1930s. By 1914 there were 2,050 branches and by 1930 there 
were 3,481, an average of 387 per bank (Butlin 1986; Australia 1908, 1930, and 
1931).  
 
Although all Australian banks were allowed to open branches, the extent to which 
they actually did so varied considerably. In 1914, the largest bank (the Bank of New 
South Wales) operated 284 branches, whereas the smallest (Bathurst Bank) operated 
only one. The largest six banks operated over 56 percent of the nation’s branches. 
Over time the industry consolidated though a series of mergers and by 1970 there 
were only 11 banks remaining, all but two of which operated at least 150 branches 
(White 1973).  
 
During the early years of settlement, almost all branches were located in the major 
population centers. However, beginning in the 1870s, the majority of new branches 
were set up away from the cities. At the turn of the twentieth century, 78 percent of 
Victorian branches were in rural areas, whereas 54.9 percent of the population lived in 
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cities of at least 5,000 and 43.1 percent lived in Melbourne alone (Hill 1982).5 The 
proportion of branches in rural areas remained high throughout the century. In 1946 
69.1 percent of branches throughout Australia were in rural areas (White 1973). It was 
common for small rural towns to have several branches operated by different banks. 
For example, in 1920 the Australian Bank of Commerce, the Bank of New South 
Wales, the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney, the London Bank of Australia, 
and the Union Bank of Australia all operated branches in Hay, New South Wales, a 
town with a population of approximately 2,500 (International Banking Directory). As 
a consequence of the large number of branches in rural towns, the ratio of population 
to banking offices was considerably lower in Australia than the rest of the world 
(Butlin 1986; Vamplew 1987, series POP25; Australia 1931; Grossman 1994). By 
comparison, the United States had about a third the number of banking offices per 
capita as Australia. Rural areas accounted for a higher proportion of the American 
population, 43.5 percent in 1940, but a lower proportion of banking offices, 51.9 
percent in 1940 (Board of Governors 1941 and United States 1997, Series A57 and 
A69).  
 
Prior to the 1890s, trading bank failures were relatively uncommon in Australia, with 
annual average failure rates of 0.67, 0.95, 0.71, and 2.16 percent of trading banks in 
the 1850s, 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s respectively (Butlin 1986). However, at the end of 
the long-boom in 1890, Australia suffered the worst crisis ever to occur in a branch 
banking system. Banks had invested heavily in the property market during the long-
boom. The property market collapsed dramatically in 1891, resulting in a substantial 
                                                          
5 I do not have comparable figures for other states or for Australia until 1946. However, it is likely that 
the proportion of branches in rural areas in other states was higher than for Victoria. Victoria was the 
most urbanized state, with 54.92 percent of the population living in towns of over 5000 in 1907. In 
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shock to the banks’ portfolios. Over 40 building societies and land banks in 
Melbourne and Sydney alone failed between July 1891 and March 1892 (Butlin 
1961). Worse was yet to come. In April 1892 the Bank of South Australia with its 20 
branches and £3.8 million assets, became the largest Australian bank to fail. Between 
1890 and 1893 7 of the colonies’ 31 trading banks permanently closed their doors. In 
January 1893 the Federal Bank of Australia went into liquidation, precipitating 
widespread runs on deposits at other banks. In April and May 1893 over half of the 
colonies’ trading banks, including 9 of the 12 largest, suspended payments for periods 
between 30 and 128 days (Mackay 1931; Butlin, et. al. 1971). The banks that 
suspended payments collectively held 61.5 percent of all assets of Australian trading 
banks. The crisis was national in scope, but had particularly severe effects on urban 
property markets and agriculture. 
 
III. Branching and Portfolio Diversification 
 
Perhaps the most common argument in favor of branch banking is that branching 
facilitates risk-pooling by allowing for the geographic diversification of assets 
(Calomiris 1990 and 1993; White 1983; Alston, et. al. 1994; Carlson 2004; Grossman 
1994). Individual loans held by a bank could go bad for a variety of reasons – such as 
drought, pestilence, adverse price shocks, death. Banks reduce their exposure to these 
risks by holding a diversified portfolio of assets. Part of this diversification is 
geographic, which reduces the impact of localized shocks on the overall portfolio. 
Within regions, particularly in rural areas, borrowers are often fairly homogeneous 
and exposed to the same shocks. Thus, a single localized shock could precipitate mass 
                                                                                                                                                                      
New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania this figure was 49.2, 
50.2, 54.2, 29.9, and 41.7 percent respectively (Australia, 1908). 
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default within a community. Although the banks normally insisted upon collateral for 
their loans, they would often get back only a small proportion of the book value if 
foreclosure was necessary. A unit bank, with its localized loan pool, could easily be 
wiped out by such a shock; however, a branch bank that was diversified across 
regions would have a better chance of survival because a geographically diverse set of 
assets would be less likely to go bad simultaneously. This argument can be extended 
to general, but asymmetric shocks. A branch bank is far less likely than a unit bank to 
have a high proportion of its assets held in sectors of the economy that are severely 
impacted by such a crisis. This effect may have been particularly relevant for 
Australia, which has the highest variability of rainfall of any continent and most 
regions of the country periodically suffered serious droughts (Shann 1930). Moreover, 
Australian regions tended to be highly specialized in a limited number of primary 
products and thus were highly exposed to variation in world commodity prices. 
 
More recent scholarship has argued that the relationship between geographic 
diversification and risk is far from unambiguous. This is because branching has 
multiple effects on a bank’s portfolio, which work in opposite directions. Much of the 
literature has primarily focussed upon what might be termed the ‘covariance effect’, 
whereby the risk inherent to a given type of asset will be reduced through 
diversification because the covariance on the returns of different types of assets is less 
than one (Calomiris 1990 and 1993; White 1983). However, there is also a 
‘composition effect’ whereby branch banks may adjust their asset portfolios and hold 
inherently higher risk assets than unit banks (Carlson 2004; Grossman 1994). In 
addition, branching over a wider area also makes it more difficult to monitor local 
mangers and thus increases the scope for managerial opportunism in loan decisions. 
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Finally, the growth of branch networks may be a result of optimism about future 
business conditions. If that optimism is irrational, or at least unwarranted ex post, then 
banks with larger networks are likely to have worse asset portfolios and hence be 
more likely to fail. Given that these effects work in opposite directions, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the international evidence on branch banking and bank failures has 
been somewhat mixed (Calomiris 1990 and 1993; White 1983; Alston, et. al. 1994; 
Carlson 2004; Grossman 1994). 
 
Australian contemporaries differed in their views on whether the extensive branch 
networks operated by the larger banks increased the stability of the banking system. 
A. E. Webster stated in a lecture to the Bankers’ Institute of Australia, ‘The funds of 
the banks possessing branches could be far more usefully and remuneratively 
employed and yet kept in a far more liquid condition than was formerly the case with 
the [unit] banks, who were always liable to find their funds locked up in “dead loans”’ 
(Webster 1893, p. 1440). Conversely, from the 1870s onwards, other Australian 
commentators expressed concern about the effects of the growth of branch networks 
on the composition of portfolios held by the banks. An article in the Australasian 
Insurance and Banking Record likened the proliferation of branches to rival gas 
companies laying separate pipes to the same destination (AIBR 1887). Another article 
claimed, ‘In some country towns branch banks are as plentiful as publichouses. This 
did not tend to increase the confidence of depositors, and, as a matter of fact, greatly 
helped to destroy the trust that people at one time had in some of the institutions’ 
(Black 1893, p. 324).  
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Subsequent historians have also concluded that branch growth during the long boom 
led banks to undertake poor quality, high-risk investments. S. J. Butlin wrote, ‘In the 
long boom deposits were to be had by banks prepared to open branches in small towns 
without assessing costs closely. So too, advances could be expanded rapidly by a bank 
not too restrictive as to security or length of loan. [M]any of [the colonial banks] built 
up large business in deposits and advances, and did so rapidly, by being not merely 
brash but rash’ (Butlin 1961, p. 191). Merrett (1995) also argues that the rapid 
expansion of branch networks during the long boom was associated with a decline in 
basic prudency standards. During this time banks allowed the quality of their assets to 
decline, neglected prudency standards in order to attract deposits, increased their 
activity in high-risk sectors such as property, and expanded their branch network at 
such a rate that they were forced to promote less qualified staff to the level of branch 
manager.  
 
Ultimately, whether the growth in branches during the long boom reduced or 
increased the vulnerability of Australian banking is an empirical question. To analyze 
this question, I examine the relationship between branching and three outcome 
variables: 1) failure between the end of the long boom and the 1893 panic (FAILED), 
2) being forced to suspend payments in the 1893 panic (CLOSED), and 3) the number 
of days for which payments were suspended in 1893 (DAYS CLOSED). The 
covariance effect implies that more diversified banks should have been more able to 
survive the downturn and panic, whereas the composition and irrational optimism 
effects imply the reverse. I measure branching and geographic diversification in three 
ways: the number of Australian branches maintained in 1892 (BRANCHES); the 
percent of branches outside the colony where the bank operated the most branches 
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(HOME COLONY); and the number of Australian colonies in which they operated at 
least one branch (COLONIES). The latter two measures of geographic diversification 
follow Merrett (1985), who argues that one of the problems facing Australian banks 
circa 1890 was excessive concentration of branches in the banks’ home colonies. 
Table 1 shows the values of each of these variables for the 22 banks open in March 
1893 and how each of the banks fared during the 1893 crisis.  
 
To examine the impact of expansion of the branch networks during the long boom on 
later outcomes, Figure 2 shows the growth of assets and branch numbers between 
1866 and 1890 for all banks operating during this period. Figure 2 also shows whether 
each bank failed prior to 1893 (FAILED), closed during the 1893 panic (CLOSED), 
or remained open throughout 1893 (OPEN). Finally, figure 2 shows an OLS 
regression of branch growth (BRANCH) on asset growth (ASSET). The regression 
yields (standard errors in parentheses):  
 
 BRANCH = -.1531 + 10.47ASSET  R2 = .742, F=84.29, N=29 
   (0.242)   (1.139) 
 
Virtually all banks expanded both in terms of assets and branches during the long 
boom. The correlation between asset and branch growth is high, but imperfect, 
implying that some banks pursued a branch-intensive approach to expansion (those 
above the OLS best fit line), while others focused relatively more on increasing their 
overall assets (those below the line). Figure 2 shows that rapid expansion of branch 
networks was associated with worse outcomes for individual banks and thus probably 
decreased the overall stability of the system. Banks that failed prior to 1893 were 
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generally small both in terms of assets and number of branches.6 Among the larger 
banks, those that pursued a branch-intensive expansion strategy were much more 
likely to suspend payments during the 1893 panic. Each of the three large banks that 
remained open throughout the panic had been relatively conservative about opening 
branches during the long boom, whereas only one of those that closed had been 
similarly conservative.  
 
As another test of whether geographic diversification protected banks in 1893, I have 
run a series of logistic regressions on CLOSED and OLS regressions on DAYS 
CLOSED. In addition to controlling for the three measures of the branch networks, 
the regressions also control for portfolio diversification and incumbency advantages, 
proxied by the year in which the bank was founded (YEAR FOUNDED). Butlin 
(1961) and Merrett (1985) argue that many of the banks founded during the long 
boom were excessively optimistic in their lending policies and regarded expansion of 
business to be more important than maintaining standards of prudent banking. In 
addition to excessive optimism, they may have needed to take on riskier loans simply 
because the established banks had ongoing relationships with the better customers. 
For these reasons, one would expect that the older banks would have been less likely 
to suspend payments and those that were forced to suspend payments would have 
been shut for shorter periods of time. Thus, the coefficient on YEAR FOUNDED is 
expected to be be positive. If geographic diversification served to lessen the riskiness 
of the banks’ portfolios then one would expect a negative coefficient on the branching 
variables.  
 
                                                          
6Fourteen banks failed between 1866 and 1893. Six of these operated at least 10 branches at the time of 
failure. The largest bank to fail was the Bank of South Australia which operated 28 branches and had 
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Table 2 shows the regression results. Because of the relatively small number of 
observations (22 banks), some caution is necessary in interpreting table 2. However, 
the main results on the variables of interest are fairly consistent across specification. 
There is strong evidence that the older banks were better able to survive the panic. On 
the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that more extensively branched banks 
were better able to survive the panic. In each case the coefficient on the branching 
variable is positive, although only the coefficient on BRANCHES in the logit 
regression is significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
IV. Branch Specialization 
 
An alternative argument for the superiority of branch banking is that it allowed for 
specialization and exchange among branches of the same bank. The crux of this 
argument is that branch banks could reallocate resources from capital surplus regions 
to capital deficit regions far more efficiently than could unit banks. If customers were 
attracted by the convenience of a local branch and distant loans were costly to 
monitor, a unit bank would be restricted to conducting business in its immediate area. 
On the other hand, a branch bank could, at very low cost, move capital from one 
region with surplus deposits to another region with a deposit shortage. A related 
argument is that ‘bankless towns’ were likely to arise under unit banking. In the early-
twentieth century United States, which operated a unit banking system, many small 
towns did not have sufficient business to support an independent bank. These towns 
suffered significant commercial disadvantages as a result (Chapman and Westerfield 
1942).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
assets of £3.8 million in 1890, ranking 12th and 14th respectively among all trading banks. 
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Contemporary commentators argued that Australian banks’ extensive branch 
networks played an essential role in reallocation of capital between regions. One 
noted that: ‘There are places where [a branch] receives more deposits than it makes in 
loans. In other localities the … deposits are smaller while there is a greater demand 
for loans. A bank with branches all over the country can thus send the surplus money 
gathered up in one branch to be loaned at another’ (Anonymous 1893, p. 225). This 
reallocation of capital was viewed as beneficial to the banks, as noted by A. E. 
Webster: 
 
‘Creditor branches’ might [separately]… seem to be a loss to the bank, 
for they may obtain such a plentiful supply of money on deposit, the 
[cost of] which … may appear to be more than the amount earned by 
the branch. [T]his apparent loss may be in reality the bank’s gain; … 
[transferring] this capital … may earn [at a ‘debtor branch’] such good 
returns as to provide a sufficient profit for both branches (Webster 
1893, p. 1442). 
 
Others argued that the reallocation of capital by transfers between branches had been 
essential to providing rural areas access to financial markets and to the development 
of these areas. For example, one wrote:  
 
By [opening numerous branches] the banks have vastly increased the 
services they render to the community. Branches have been established 
… even in the remotest bush townships. … In the absence of the 
system, it is hard to conceive how, in our sparsely populated country, 
banking could have been of such signal service as it has undoubtedly 
been to the squatter, selector, minor, and storekeeper, who have been so 
instrumental in opening up the country (Anonymous 1900, p. 375). 
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1. A Simple model of branch specialization 
 
 
To more formally examine the relative efficiency of branch and unit banks, I consider 
a simple model of profit maximization for a small, isolated rural region under unit and 
branch banking. The two efficiency criteria considered are the ability of a bank to 
transform deposits into loans and whether they are able to provide banking services to 
small towns. In isolated regions there are high ‘convenience costs’ to using a distant 
bank. For the purpose of simplicity it is assumed that these costs are sufficiently high 
to rule out ‘commuting’. Likewise, it is assumed to be prohibitively costly for banks 
based outside the region to monitor local borrowers. Thus all deposits and loans must 
be made through local institutions.  Finally, it is assumed that a bank’s capital can 
only be raised through deposits and can only be utilized as loans.7 Under these 
assumptions both a unit bank and a branch would be viable if: 
 
 = iLLj - iDDj -   0        1.  
Where: 
iL – expected return on loans. This is a continuous variable equal to 
the interest rate charged by the bank (adjusted by the 
probability of default and administrative costs of the loan).  
iD – interest rate paid on deposits. Assumed to be constant. 
Lj – amount of loans 
Dj – amount of deposits 
 – fixed wage and capital costs, assumed to be exogenous to the 
banking system.  
 – total profits 
j – denotes values of loans (deposits) issued (collected) by bank j 
 
 
                                                          
7These assumptions are based on the experience of small unit banks in rural parts of the United States. 
These banks specialized almost exclusively in local loans and investments and were extremely 
reluctant to raise capital by borrowing from other banks. Inter-bank borrowing in the United States, 
comprised only 1.06 percent, 3.04 percent, and 0.07 percent respectively of the capital raised through 
deposits in 1913, 1929, and 1938, respectively (Chapman and Westerfield 1942). 
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Since a unit bank must raise and utilize its capital locally, deposits and loans must be 
at levels such that: 
 
Lj  (1 – R)Dk  and  Dj < Dk     
 2. 
 
Where: 
R is the reserve ratio8,  
k denotes loans (deposits) locally available in region k 
 
 
Solving this for Lk and Dk, it can be seen that a unit bank will be viable if: 
 
 
 
         and              3.  
 
or, alternatively: 
     3a. 
 
 
Branch banks face a different constraint because deposits received by one branch can 
be profitably used as loans or investments by another branch. In practice, banks could 
productively utilize both deposits and loans generated by any branch based in 
Australia or New Zealand. Most Australian banks faced on-going capital shortages, 
which they made up for by operating offices in London that collected deposits at a 
higher interest rate than paid in Australia and did not issue loans.9 Thus the individual 
branch within a network only faces the constraint that both deposits and loans are 
nonnegative and that Lj<Lk and Dj<Dk. Under this framework, the returns on loans 
                                                          
8As with the fixed costs, I assume that the reserve holdings are the same under branch and unit banking 
and relaxing this assumption strengthens the case for branch banking. Generally, branch banks had 
considerably lower reserve to liability ratios than unit banks (Calomiris 1993; Carlson 2004). 
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will be (iL - iD(1/1-R))Lk/2 and the returns on deposits will be (iL(1-R)- iD)Dk/2. Thus 
a branch bank will be viable if: 
 
   4. 
 
or, alternatively: 
     4a. 
 
To illustrate the difference between a branch and a unit bank, consider the case where 
reserves are zero. Viability requires:  for a unit bank and 
 for a branch.10 It is evident from casual inspection that the viability 
constraint for a branch is less restrictive than that for a unit bank. This is also 
illustrated in figure 3. The curves denoted U reflect isoprofit lines for a unit bank and 
the curves denoted B reflect isoprofit lines for a branch in towns with different 
combinations of loans and deposits (Dk and Lk). The curves U0 and B0 reflect the 
combinations of loans and deposits for which a unit bank and a branch office 
respectively will be viable. Figure 3 illustrates two sources of greater efficiency of a 
branch banking system. First, the area above U0 is larger than the area above B0. It is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9In 1892 10 of the largest Australian banks collected an average of approximately 28 percent of their 
deposits in London (Mackay 1931).   
10Even with the possibility of inter-bank borrowing in a unit banking system, there are still likely to be 
gains from specialization under branch banking. Suppose that if Lk>(1-R)Dk a rural unit bank can 
borrow B from a city bank at interest rate iB. The rural unit bank’s objective function becomes:  = iLL 
- iDD - iBB -  whereas a rural branch could obtain additional capital by utilizing excess deposits from 
other branches and thus would have the objective function:  = iLLk - iD(Dk + B) - . The interest rate iB 
will be greater than the rate iD because the city bank must cover the costs associated with 
administration, monitoring, and default.  Under this framework, a region could support a branch, but 
not a unit bank if (iB - iD)B > iLLk - iDDk - . Individual loans would be viable under branching but not 
under unit banking if iB  iL > iD. Put differently, loans with relatively high default probabilities would 
be viable if financed by low interest deposits, but not if financed by higher interest inter-bank 
borrowing. 
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thus possible for a location to have enough business to support a branch, but not a unit 
bank. A town with available deposits and loans between B0 and U0 will be bankless 
under a unit banking system, but capable of supporting at least one branch. Secondly, 
viable points above and to the left of the locus AA will have an excess supply of 
capital (deposits exceed loans) whereas viable points below and to the right of the 
locus AA will have an excess demand for capital.11 In a branch banking system, the 
excess deposits at one branch can be channeled into loans at another branch, whereas 
in a unit banking system they will remain idle. Suppose local supply and demand for 
capital are at point P in figure 3, thus desired deposits exceed desired loans. A unit 
bank will be unable to productively use the excess deposits and thus will not accept 
them, producing the outcome at Q. On the other hand, a branch bank will channel the 
excess deposits into another branch, thus P is a viable outcome. Under branch 
banking, P lies on a higher isoprofit line than Q and thus is more efficient.  
 
This framework provides an explanation for the considerably larger number of 
banking offices per capita and the greater concentration of offices in rural regions in 
Australia, where branching was not restricted, than in the United States, where it was 
restricted. It also provides an explanation for greater competition between banks in 
rural regions. Under unit banking the number of offices that a town can support is a 
function of the minimum of deposits or loans, whereas under branch banking it is a 
function of the sum. Consequently, a branch banking system may be able to support 
more banking offices in a particular location, and thus the extent of local monopoly 
power is likely to be lower. 
 
                                                          
11The locus AA is the set of points above U0 and B0 where L=(1-R)D. 
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2. Evidence of Branch Specialization at the Union Bank of Australia 
 
The model from the previous section yields several testable predictions. In a bank 
with multiple branches, individual branches can be expected to specialize to some 
extent in either the collection of deposits or issuing loans. This specialization is likely 
to be geographically driven. Areas with a higher urban population would be more 
likely to be relatively specialized in collecting deposits, whereas areas with low 
population density and those dominated by the primary sector would have been 
relatively more specialized in issuing loans. Finally, the model implies that some 
branches could only survive as a specialized part of a larger branch network. 
 
This section tests these predictions of the model using unpublished micro-data 
covering branch-level loans and deposits at the Union Bank of Australia (UBA) from 
1900 and 1930, a London-domiciled trading bank which conducted the vast majority 
of its business in the Antipodes. During the period of this study, the UBA was one of 
the largest and most successful banks in Australia, ranking third in the value of its 
assets in 1890 as shown in table 1. The UBA was fundamentally more conservative 
than its competitors in terms of its asset portfolio and approach to expansion during 
the long boom (Butlin 1961 and Merrett 1985).12 Despite this conservatism, at the end 
of the long boom most of the UBA’s branches were in rural areas.13 
 
The main source of data are the Annual Reports of the UBA’s branches (U/218, 
U/219, U/220, U/221, U/222).  The Annual Reports contain the values of each 
                                                          
12This can be seen in figure 2, as the UBA is the second furthest below the OLS best-fit line. By 1890 
the UBA had virtually stopped opening new branches, although it did acquire 20 branches after 
absorbing the Bank of South Australia in 1892 (Butlin 1986). 
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branch’s advances, deposits, and accounting profits over the preceding year. The ANZ 
Group Archive contains the Annual Reports for the years 1900-30 for Victoria, 
Queensland, Tasmania, and Western Australia; 1900-17 and 1925-30 for New South 
Wales; and 1900-10 and 1927-35 for South Australia. I have collected data on 
deposits and advances for each branch of the bank in 1900 and 1930. A second source 
of data from the ANZ Group Archive are the personnel records contained in the 
Register of Officers (U/271/1, U/271/2, U/272/3). These records contain the wages, 
position, and branch location for all employees at the bank between 1888 and 1899. 
These records are used to estimate the wage costs of operating a branch.  
 
As an indicator of specialization, I have calculated the ratio of advances to deposits 
for each branch (ADV/DEP). Across all of the UBA’s Australian branches in 1930 the 
ratio of total advances to total deposits was 0.96. However, the UBA’s London office 
almost exclusively specialized in collecting deposits, and thus it is likely that the 
bank’s overall reserve ratio was considerably higher than the 4 percent implied by the 
advance-deposit ratio. The ratio of total advances to deposits hides considerable 
variation across the branches, and a substantial number of branches specialized 
primarily in either loans or deposits. In 1930 37.9 percent of branches have a value of 
ADV/DEP either below 0.4 or above 2.5. Figure 4 shows the distribution of 
ADV/DEP in 1900 and 1930, along with a normal distribution with the same mean 
and variance, to act as a benchmark. It can be seen that most branches specialized in 
either loans or deposits, at least to some degree. The overall picture is similar for 
1900, although the variance of the distribution is slightly larger, implying a greater 
level of specialization. Over 55 percent of branches had values either under 0.4 or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13In 1900 only 15.5 percent of its branches were in the capital cities and 21.4 percent were in other 
cities with populations of at least 10,000. In 1930 these figures were 14.9 and 9.3 percent.  
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over 2.5. In general, urban branches specialized in collecting deposits while rural 
branches specialized in issuing loans. In 1900 (1930) the average value of ADV/DEP 
was 1.07 (1.42) for rural branches and 0.52 (0.82) for urban branches. The correlation 
between the 1900 and 1930 values of ADV/DEP across branches is 0.60, suggesting 
that values that were either significantly above or below one were due to the 
underlying characteristics of the branch, not short-term shocks to advances or 
deposits.   
 
To examine the nature of specialization and the extent to which it reallocated capital 
from urban to rural regions, I have run a series of regressions on ADV/DEP for 1900 
and 1930. The regressions take the form:14 
 
ie

116 iji5
ii4i3i2i1i
STATEb  POPULATION DISTRICT b 
 RURAL*AGE b  RURAL b  SQUARED AGE b  AGE b  a ]ADV/DEPLn[1 5.
  
where: 
 
AGE – age of the branch 
AGE SQUARED – age of the branch squared 
RURAL – Dummy, one if located in a town of less than 10,00015 
AGE * RURAL – Interaction of age and rural 
DISTRICT POPULATION – Population (in 1000s) of the region serviced by the 
branch, available for rural regions only in 1930  
STATE – Dummy variables for New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia, and Tasmania, omitted state is Victoria 
i – denotes branch i  
  
 
The expected signs of the coefficients on the independent variables are as follows. 
The age variables (AGE, AGE SQUARED, AGE*RURAL) are proxies for the 
                                                          
14The transformation of the dependent variable proved necessary because 1) ADV/DEP is bounded at 
zero 2) and the residuals from similar regressions on ADV/DEP (unlogged) are highly skewed left and 
mesokurtic. 
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economic maturity of the region. Their net combined effect is expected to be negative 
because less established regions would likely have had a shortage of local depositors 
relative to borrowers; whereas the reverse would have been true of older, more 
established regions. If branch specialization was important for reallocation of capital 
and rural development, one would expect a positive coefficient on RURAL. Rural 
regions are likely to have been able to raise relatively little capital from deposits, but 
able to support considerable advances to large-scale primary industry. Similarly, older 
and larger rural regions may have more potential depositors than newer and smaller 
regions and thus the coefficients on AGE*RURAL and DISTRICT POPULATION 
are both expected to be negative. Finally, state dummies are included as a control for 
variation across locations and I do not have prior expectations on the signs of their 
coefficients.  
 
The regression results are shown in table 3. The results are generally in accordance 
with the predictions of the model and indicate that intra-bank transfers resulted in 
considerable reallocation of capital from urban to rural areas. The regressions are all 
strongly significant and explain between 25.6 percent and 47.9 percent of variation in 
the dependent variable for 1900 and 1930 respectively. The net effect of age is given 
by [b1AGE + b2AGE SQUARED] for urban regions and [(b1+b4)AGE + b2AGE 
SQUARED] for rural regions. Evaluating the 1900 regression results at the mean 
value of AGE, the net effect of age is approximately zero for rural branches founded 
after 1870, negative for rural branches founded before 1870, and positive for urban 
branches. For 1930 the net effect of age is negative for both urban and rural branches. 
The strongest result in table 3 is that rural branches tended to specialize in issuing 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15The data on town population are from Australia (1908 and 1930).  
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loans while urban branches tended to specialize in taking deposits. The coefficient on 
RURAL is positive and strongly significant in both 1900 and 1930. The magnitude of 
the effect of RURAL is considerably larger than the magnitude of the combined 
effects of the other independent variables. The coefficient on AGE*RURAL is 
negative, indicating that older rural areas were less specialized in advances. Finally, in 
the 1930 specification restricted to rural branches, there is weak evidence that 
branches in less populated areas were more specialized in issuing loans. 
 
The model also implies that some regions that could support a branch would not have 
been capable of supporting a unit bank. This can be examined using a simple 
counterfactual exercise. Recall that deposits and loans could take any non-negative 
values at a branch; however, at a unit bank they are constrained such that Lj  (1 – 
R)Dk and that viability required iLLj - iDDj -   0. Under the counterfactual 
assumption that each branch operated as a unit bank, the branch would be viable if 
and only if  = iLL* - iDD* -   0, where L*=MIN(Lk, [1-R]Dk) and D*=MIN([Lk/1-
R], Dk). The counterfactual values L* and D* are thus the values of deposits collected 
and loans issued, assuming that all capital was generated internally by the branch. As 
an alternative counterfactual, I assume that when local deposits fell short of potential 
loans that the bank could borrow capital on the external market at iB, a rate between iL 
and iD. 
 
The Annual Reports provide Lj and Dj for all branches, which for a branch bank is 
equal to Lk and Dk. It is possible to estimate plausible values for iL and iD. The gross 
return on loans issued by the Melbourne branch typically averaged about 8 percent at 
the turn of the century (Butlin 1961). This implies a net return of 6 to 8 percent, 
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allowing for a downward adjustment of up to 2 basis point for default and 
administrative costs. According to Butlin, the interest paid on deposits averaged about 
3 percent (Butlin 1961). As a robustness check of this exercise, I examine a 
counterfactual in which there exists a perfectly elastic external supply of credit at a 
borrowing rate of 5 percent. The fixed costs, , can be broken down into two 
components, wages and costs associated with maintaining the office (construction and 
furnishing the building, provision of housing for the manager, maintenance costs, 
correspondence with the head office, inspection costs, etc.). It is possible to obtain a 
reasonable estimate for the wage bill for a small country branch using the UBA’s 
employment records. Such a branch would have had only two staff: a manager and an 
accountant/teller. Employees at smaller branches were typically paid slightly less than 
staff at larger branches of a similar rank (Seltzer and Merrett 2000). As a conservative 
estimate of the wage costs of a small branch, I use the 5th percentile of the earnings 
distribution for managers and accountant/tellers; in 1899 these were £200 and £120, 
respectively, implying a real salary cost of £331.85 and £594.29, in 1900 and 1930 
prices, respectively.16 The actual wage costs are likely to have been somewhat higher, 
which would imply a higher proportion of branches would not have been viable. I 
have not been able to find any records of non-wage costs; thus, I have assumed that 
they fall between £100 and £2000 annually, with lower levels in that range being 
more plausible for a smaller branch. 
 
For the purpose of this analysis I assume that iL takes on values of either 6 or 8 
percent, non-wage costs takes on values between £100 and £2000, and the reserve 
                                                          
16 Prices are deflated using Vamplew (1987) series, PC31. 
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ratio was zero.17 Table 3 shows the proportion of the UBA’s branches that would not 
have been viable under different assumptions about iL, , and iB. It is evident that 
despite the assumptions of zero reserves, wage costs near the bottom of the 
distribution, and low (or no) administrative and default costs, a fairly high proportion 
of branches would not have been viable as unit banks. A sizable majority of branches 
that would not have been viable as unit banks were in rural regions, confirming the 
previous evidence that branch banking increased access to banking services in these 
regions. For example, using the 1930 figures with the assumptions that iL=.6 and 
=750, 40 percent of rural branches would not have been viable as unit banks, 
compared to 19.6 percent of urban branches.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
Most recent literature comparing unit and branch banking has focussed on whether 
branching increases the stability of banking systems. Branch banking has been viewed 
by some authors as superior to unit banking because branch banks can diversify their 
loan portfolio across regions, and thus are partly insured against localized shocks. 
However, there also exists a literature that argues that that branch banks compensate 
for geographic diversification by holding inherently riskier assets, and thus do not 
have overall lower levels of risk. To test whether extensive branching increased the 
stability of the Australian financial system, I have examined the relationship between 
the extent of branching and the effect of the banking crisis of 1893 for the 22 
Australian trading banks open in March 1893. The evidence confirms the conclusions 
                                                          
17 The assumption of no reserves is made for the purpose of simplicity of calculation. Increasing the 
reserve ratio would reduce the returns of the branch (in equation 1) and thus reduce the proportion of 
branches that were viable. 
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of Butlin (1961); Merrett (1985); and Pope (1987) who argued that more extensively 
branched banks acquired a more inherently risky portfolio of assets during the long 
boom of 1866-89. Banks with a more extensive branch network, and particularly 
those that expanded rapidly during the long boom, were more likely to suspend 
payments in 1893.  
 
An alternative hypothesis, namely that branching facilitated specialization across 
regions, provides a more compelling explanation for the importance of branch 
banking to Australian economic development. The intuition behind this hypothesis is 
that a branch bank can transfer capital at very low cost from regions where potential 
deposits exceed available loans to regions where potential loans exceed available 
deposits. On the other hand, because unit banks need to interact with intermediaries to 
make similar capital transfers, they could only do so at high cost. Using a simple 
model, I show that, all else equal, branch banking will lead to a more efficient 
allocation of capital between regions than unit banking except under the specific (and 
unrealistic) scenario that desired loans exactly equal desired deposits (less reserves) in 
every region. Moreover, the model implies that some regions, particularly small rural 
regions with primary industry, may be capable of supporting a branch but not a unit 
bank. Evidence from the Annual Reports of the branches of the Union Bank of 
Australia confirms these predictions of the model. A large proportion of branches 
maintained advance to deposit ratios that would have been unprofitable for a unit 
bank. Moreover, the ratio systematically varied across regions, with branches in small 
towns and rural areas issuing considerably more advances than they collected in 
deposits and branches in urban areas collected more deposits than they issued in 
loans.  
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Figure 1 
Number of Banks and Branches in Australia, 1817-1914 
 
Source: Butlin (1986). 
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Figure 2 
Branch and Asset Growth During the Long Boom and Impact of the 1893 Panic 
 
 
Sources: Butlin, Hall and White (1971); Butlin (1986); and Mackay (1931). 
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Figure 3 
Isoprofit Curves Under Branch and Unit Banking 
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Figure 4 
Distribution of the Advance/Deposit Ratio at UBA Branches, 1900 and 1930 
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Note:  There were a handfull of very small branches which had advance-deposit ratios over 5. These 
outliers were excluded from the graph in order to better illustrate the underlying distribution. 
 
Sources: Union Bank of Australia, Annual Reports, U/218, U/219, U/220, U/221, U/222. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Australian Trading Banks Open in March 1893  
 
 
Bank Closed in 1893 Branches Colonies Home Colony Assets 
Commercial Bank of Australia YES, 30 Days 104 6 21.2 10.0 
English, Scottish & Australian YES, 128 Days 107 5 59.8 7.2 
Australian Joint Stock Bank YES, 59 Days 203 2 9.85 10.9 
London Chartered Bank of Aus. YES, 106 Days 67 3 41.8 7.5 
Standard Bank of Australia YES, 105 Days 2 1 0 NA 
National Bank of Australia YES, 56 Days 159 4 42.8 9.8 
Colonial Bank of Australia YES, 65 Days 84 1 0 4.7 
Bank of Victoria YES, 40 Days 68 1 0 6.6 
Queensland National Bank YES, 79 Days 66 2 1.5 8.9 
Bank of North Queensland YES, 65 Days  14 2 7.1 0.7 
Com. Banking Co. of Sydney YES, 33 Days 151 2 8.6 11.9 
City of Melbourne Bank YES, 33 Days 5 1 0 5.1 
Royal Bank of Queensland YES, 82 Days 21 1 0 1.4 
Bank of Australasia. NO 120 5 50.0 13.8 
Union Bank of Australia NO 88 6 71.6 12.9 
Bank of New South Wales NO 163 5 39.9 18.1 
City Bank of Sydney NO 21 1 0 2.3 
Royal Bank of Australia NO 1 1 0 1.0 
Bank of Adelaide NO 20 1 0 1.6 
Com. Bank of Tasmania NO 14 1 0 2.1 
National Bank of Tasmania NO 16 1 0 0.6 
Western Australia Bank NO 10 1 0 0.4 
 
Notes:  Branches = Number of branches operated in Australia in 1892. 
 Colonies = Number of colonies operating at least one branch in 1892. 
 Assets = Total assets in 1890 in £ million. 
 Home Colony = Percent of branches outside the colony with the head office. 
 
 
Sources: Data for Branches, Home State, and States are from Butlin (1986). Data for 
Closed and Days Closed are from Mackay (1931). Data for Assets are from 
Butlin, Hall and White (1971). 
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Table2 
Regression Analysis on the Determinates of Closure During the 1893 Panic 
 
 
Dependent Variable DAYS 
CLOSED 
DAYS 
CLOSED 
DAYS 
CLOSED 
CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED 
Year Founded .692 
(.378) 
.825* 
(.409) 
.864* 
(.416) 
.042* 
(.024) 
.042* 
(.025) 
.1359** 
(.067) 
States 2.995 
(5.03) 
  .146 
(2.85) 
  
Outside HS  51.80 
(39.93) 
  .924 
(2.18) 
 
Branches   .209 
(.153) 
  .051* 
(.028) 
Regression Type OLS OLS OLS LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT 
Adjusted R2 .040 .102 .110 .152 .148 .407 
F-Statistic 1.44 2.19 2.30    
Chi-Square    3.62 3.53 11.51*** 
% Correct     68.2 72.7 77.3 
Sample Size 22 22 22 22 22 22 
 
 
Notes:  The Cox-Snell R2 is reported for logit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * = 
significance at the 10% level. ** = significance at the 5% level. *** = significance at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of the Advance/Deposit Ratio 
 
 
Dependent Variable Ln (1+ADV/DEP30) Ln(1+ADV/DEP30)  
Rural branches only 
Ln(1+ADV/DEP00) 
NSW .366** 
(.112) 
.398** 
(.139) 
.00325 
(.178) 
QLD -.178 
(.158) 
-.228 
(.210) 
-.294 
(.216) 
SA -.162 
(.160) 
-.124 
(.196) 
-.119 
(.187) 
WA .397** 
(.136) 
.341* 
(.158) 
-.804** 
(0.200) 
TAS -.185 
(.352) 
.489 
(.590) 
-0.043 
(.469) 
AGE -.0265** 
(.008) 
-.0582** 
(.009) 
0.045* 
(0.022) 
AGE SQUARED .000255** 
(.00008) 
.000521** 
(.0001) 
-0.00065* 
(0.0003) 
RURAL .731** 
(.197) 
 1.002** 
(.294) 
AGE*RURAL -.01355** 
(.005) 
 -0.0313* 
(.012) 
DISTRICT POPULATION 
 
 -.0000011* 
(.0000005) 
 
CONSTANT 1.10** 
(.199) 
2.059** 
(.158) 
0.044 
(.328) 
    
F 16.531** 14.445** 4.09** 
Adjusted R2 .466 .379 .256 
N 160 117 81 
 
 
 
Notes:   DISTRICT POPULATION is available only for rural and small city branches in 1930. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * = significance at 5% level. ** = significance at 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Viability of UBA Branches as Unit Banks 
 
 
Non-Wage costs 100 250 500 750 1000 1500 2000 
1900 (iL-iD)=.03 47.6 
(39.8) 
65.5 
(51.8) 
72.6 
(67.5) 
79.8 
(75.9) 
81.0 
(79.5) 
88.1 
(86.8) 
90.5 
(88.0) 
1900 (iL-iD)=.05 29.8 
(21.7) 
40.5 
(30.1) 
59.5 
(43.4) 
66.7 
(53.0) 
71.4 
(62.7) 
79.8 
(68.7) 
83.3 
(80.7) 
1930 (iL-iD)=.03 30.4 
(20.5) 
35.4 
(24.2) 
44.1 
(32.9) 
49.7 
(41.0) 
56.5 
(51.6) 
72.1 
(64.6) 
82.6 
(77.6) 
1930 (iL-iD)=.05 18.1 
(6.8) 
22.4 
(12.4) 
28.0 
(14.9) 
34.8 
(20.5) 
39.1 
(23.0) 
47.8 
(31.7) 
55.9 
(41.0) 
 
 
Notes: The top figure is the percentage of branches fail to satisfy .03(L*-D*) – α > 0 or .05(L*-D*) – α 
> 0. This is the percentage of branches that would not be viable as unit banks if all capital had to 
be raised locally as deposits. 
 
The figure in parentheses is the percentage of branches that fail to satisfy [.03(L*-D*) – α] + 
.01(L-D) > 0 or [.05(L*-D*) – α] + .03(L-D) >0 if L>D. This is the percentage of branches that 
would not be viable as unit banks if there existed a perfectly elastic supply of credit at a 5 
percent interest rate. 
 
